We combine several sources of data in order to construct a complete panel data set of aged Medicare enrollees during the time period 2006 through 2011. We use four main …les, all within the administrative CMS data: the Enrollment Database (EDB), the Risk Adjustment Processing System (RAPS), the Monthly Membership Detail (MMD) database, and the Health Plan Management System (HPMS). We supplement this with information from other CMS auxiliary administrative …les.
plan's service area but then moved to a di¤erent location outside of the plan's service area.
In this case, the individual has the option to remain in his MA plan.
5. The individual is enrolled in a plan type other than Local CCP or PFFS. There are a small number of plans that are not Local CCP or PFFS plans, such as regional PPOs, and their payments are set according to di¤erent bidding rules. Therefore, we drop these plans in order to focus our analysis on the MA program's primary competitive bidding rules.
6. The individual was enrolled in an employer-sponsored "800-series" MA plan. Although this is a relatively large and important segment of the MA market, we drop these plans from our analysis for three reasons. First, the choice of plan is made not by the Medicare bene…ciary but instead by the employer, which renders these plans unsuitable for demand analysis. Second, these plans are not available to all Medicare bene…ciaries and are thus not part of the choice set for Medicare bene…ciaries who are not a¢ liated with the relevant employer. Third, it is likely that these plans are subsidized by the employer, and we do not observe the subsidy amounts.
7. The individual is enrolled in an MA Special-Needs Plan (SNP). These MA plans specialize in serving MA enrollees who have special needs or have chronic conditions. While this segment of the market is interesting, we focus our attention on MA plans that are intended for the broader market of Medicare bene…ciaries.
The individual is enrolled in a PFFS plan. PFFS is an anomalous plan type that was some-
what prevalent during our sample period but has since become obsolete. PFFS plans are not typical "managed care"plans. While MA insurers can vary the cost sharing requirements and other attributes of PFFS plans, they do not impose provider networks and engage in other activities that are typically used to steer enrollees toward certain providers. We have repeated our main analysis including the PFFS plans and we obtain similar results, so including these plans would not impact our main conclusions.
The analysis sample obtained after the drops described above is an unbalanced panel: an individual can leave the sample if he dies, and newly eligible Medicare enrollees enter the sample each year. The exact numbers of observations in the starting and …nal samples are reported in Appendix Table A1 .
A.2. Variable De…nitions
TM or MA indicator. The EDB contains information at the monthly level on enrollment in Medicare Parts A, B, and C. We classify an individual as TM if he was enrolled in Medicare Parts A and B during the …rst month of enrollment that we observe for the observation year, and we classify him as MA if he was enrolled in Medicare Part C during the …rst month of enrollment that we observe for the observation year.
Age. This is constructed using the bene…ciary's birth date in the EDB, and computed as of December 31 of the observation year.
Male. This variable is constructed from the demographic information in the EDB.
Urban. We de…ne "urban" using the classi…cation that was used to set the urban ‡oor in 2004, when the urban ‡oor was last set prior to the beginning of our sample period. We identify counties that were at the urban ‡oor in 2004, and we construct an urban indicator that is equal to one if the individual lives in one of these counties.
New enrollee. The EDB contains a variable with the Medicare bene…ciary's Medicare start date. If the year of this start date is equal to the observation year, then we de…ne that bene…ciary as a new enrollee.
Supplemental insurance (Medigap or RSI).
The CMS administrative …les contain a bene…ciary insurance pro…le that provides information on which bene…ciaries have supplemental insurance on top of regular Medicare. We construct a supplemental insurance indicator that is equal to one if a bene…ciary appears in the …le that lists those bene…ciaries with supplemental insurance.
Part D. The EDB contains information at the monthly level on enrollment in Medicare Part D. We construct a Part D indicator that is equal to one if the bene…ciary is enrolled in Part D during any month of the observation year.
Died. The EDB contains a variable with the Medicare bene…ciary's date of death. We construct an indicator for death during the observation year that is equal to one if the year of death is equal to the observation year.
Risk score. For TM enrollees, we use the risk scores in RAPS, which are calculated for all Medicare bene…ciaries (not only MA enrollees). For MA enrollees, we use the risk scores in the MMD that are used to compute MA payments. We apply year-speci…c normalization factors to ensure that the TM risk scores are comparable to the risk scores in the MMD. That is, as CMS publicly reports that it also does, we divide risk scores by 1 in 2006, 1.029 in 2007, 1.040 in 2008, 1.030 in 2009, 1.041 in 2010 , and 1.058 in 2011. We are able to verify that the normalized MA risk scores from the RAPS and the MA risk scores from the MA payments …le are almost always identical, except for the years 2010 and 2011. In those latter two years, the MA risk scores in the payment …les also incorporate an upcoding adjustment (CMS publicly reports that it divided all MA risk scores by 1.0341 and this coincides with what we observe in the MA risk scores that are used to compute payments in the MA payments …les).
TM monthly claims costs. We use the payment variables in the Medicare claims …les to construct total taxpayer costs for the observation year (we exclude bene…ciary cost-sharing amounts). We divide this by the number of months enrolled in Parts A and B in order to obtain monthly claims costs for TM enrollees.
MA monthly total CMS payment. In the MMD database, we observe monthly payments made to MA plans on behalf of each MA enrollee. We assign each MA enrollee to the plan in which he is enrolled in August of the observation year. We use August because September through December is not available for our last two observation years, 2010 and 2011. If the MA enrollee does not appear among the August payments (for instance, because he died earlier during the observation year), then we assign his plan in July, and so on, working backwards until we reach January. Once we have assigned each MA enrollee to a particular MA plan, we also use the MA payment associated with the particular month that was used, and we de…ne this as the MA monthly total CMS payment.
MA monthly rebate payment. We use the same procedure described in de…ning the MA monthly total CMS payment. We use the MA rebate associated with the particular month that was used to assign an MA enrollee's plan, and de…ne this as the MA monthly rebate payment.
A.3. Medicare Advantage Plan Panel Data Set
For our analysis of competitive bidding, we combine information from the HPMS and MMD to construct a panel data set of all MA plans o¤ered from 2006 through 2011. We use the HPMS to construct the o¢ cial set of plan o¤erings in each county-year. The HPMS is a database maintained by CMS that contains the o¢ cial list of approved MA plans in each year, including the list of counties in which each plan can operate (known as the plan's "service area"). The HPMS also has information on the organization that o¤ers each plan (i.e., the name of the private insurer), as well as a unique contract identi…er and plan identi…er.
In addition, we observe basic plan characteristics, such as whether the plan o¤ers Part C supplemental bene…ts, whether the plan is bundled with Part D bene…ts, and how the plan rebate is allocated across four di¤erent categories: a reduction in cost sharing, a reduction of the Part B premium, an increase in Part D bene…ts, and other mandatory bene…ts.
We do not directly observe the standardized plan bids. However, we do observe the exact di¤erence between the plan bid and the plan benchmark (since we observe the rebate directly).
Furthermore, in the MMD …le we observe the exact total payment, risk score used to calculate payment, county, contract identi…er, and plan identi…er for each MA enrollee during each month of our sample period. In addition, we observe the county benchmark, since this information is publicly available. As we describe in the paper, we know the formula used to compute the payment and rebate as a function of the bid, benchmark, and risk score. The only component in the mapping from standardized bid to payment that we do not directly observe is the plan-provided projected enrollment weights that are used to compute Intra-Service Area Rate (ISAR) factors for plancounty-year-speci…c payment rates. In some of the analysis, we use realized enrollment weights instead of projected enrollment weights. In summary, we directly observe "plan bid minus plan benchmark", which is used in our main demand analysis. In some speci…c analyses that require the standardized "plan bid", we directly observe all components needed to calculate it exactly except that we use realized plan enrollment instead of projected plan enrollment.
The initial sample has 35,367 plan-years. We drop observations according to the following criteria:
1. The plan is only o¤ered in Alaska, Guam, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands (617 plan-years).
2. The plan is a "Part B Only" plan (306 plan-years).
3. The plan is a Special Needs Plan (SNP) (3,079 plan-years). We drop these plans because they are targeted at individuals with special needs, such as those with chronic conditions, and are not the primary focus of our analysis.
4. The plan is of a type other than Local CCP or PFFS (e.g., Regional PPO or Cost) (13,461 plan-years). These alternative plan types, although numerous, serve a small fraction of MA enrollees and do not have the same competitive bidding rules as Local CCP and PFFS plans.
5. The plan is an employer-sponsored "800 series" plan (5,402 plan-years). These plans are selected by employers and are not available to all Medicare enrollees. We discuss the reasons for dropping these plans in Appendix A.1.
6. The plan bid is missing (this occurs if we do not observe a single enrollee in a given plan in the MA payments data) (191 plan-years).
7. The plan is a PFFS plan (3,687 plan-years). We discuss the reasons for dropping PFFS plans in Appendix A.1.
The …nal sample has 8,624 plan-years, each of which has at least 1 enrollee. There are 2,976 unique plans.
Appendix B: Alternative Strategies and Speci…cations for Demand Estimates
In this appendix, we discuss alternative speci…cations for demand estimates. For the sake of exposition, we focus on the case where there is no heterogeneity by dual eligibility and risk bin. Without the heterogeneity allowing for separate price coe¢ cients for each of the four consumer groups, we can discuss the impacts of speci…cation changes on two price coe¢ cients instead of eight price coe¢ cients. There are two price coe¢ cients because we still allow for the price coe¢ cient to di¤er for bids that are above and below the benchmark. In results not shown here, we also examine these speci…cations allowing for heterogeneity; we obtain similar demand estimates. In this section, for simplicity, we also do not estimate the parameter , as we do in the main demand speci…cations reported in Table 2 . We explore speci…cations using alternative samples, using instruments for price (insurer bid), using instruments for the natural logarithm of the plan's MA share, and using various forms of …xed e¤ects. Results are shown in Appendix Tables B1 through B4. In the discussion that follows, we refer to the coe¢ cient on p jk = (b jk B k ) 1fb jk B k g as and we refer to the coe¢ cient on p
B.1. Alternative Samples
Appendix Table B1 shows demand estimates from speci…cations using alternative samples. Column
(1) shows the sample and speci…cation identical to the "preferred"demand speci…cation in column (4) of Table 2 , except that there is no heterogeneity by consumer group. The "preferred" demand speci…cation excludes PFFS plans and includes dual eligibles.
Column (2) shows the same speci…cation as in column (1) Columns (5) and (6) show speci…cations using an alternative classi…cation of PFFS plans. That is, PFFS plans are classi…ed as traditional Medicare. This is motivated by the fact that PFFS plans are quite similar to traditional Medicare in that they have unrestricted provider networks. For these speci…cations, MA enrollees who are enrolled in PFFS plans are attributed to traditional Medicare, and all market share variables are recomputed accordingly. Dual eligibles are included in column (5) and are excluded in column (6). The price coe¢ cients in column (5) are quite similar to those in column (1), which is the same except for the reclassi…cation of PFFS plans. Results in column (6) are also quite similar to those in column (2), which is the same except for the reclassi…cation of PFFS plans. Thus, whether PFFS plans are excluded or classi…ed as traditional Medicare, we obtain similar demand estimates.
Across the di¤erent sample de…nitions explored in this table, we …nd price coe¢ cients that are somewhat variable, with an implied mean elasticity that ranges from -2.406 in column (1) to -7.509 in column (4). The implied mean elasticity from our "preferred" demand speci…cation in Table 2 column (4) is -6.410, which lies well within this range. Thus, the price coe¢ cients found in this table are not very di¤erent from those used in the main analysis.
B.2. Instruments for Price (Insurer Bid)
In Appendix Table B2 , we show results from demand speci…cations using instruments for price (insurer bid) that have previously been used in the MA literature. Column (1) shows a speci…cation identical to the "preferred" demand speci…cation in column (4) of what we obtain in column (1). However, we obtain an estimate of + that is positive. The implied mean elasticity is -5.561, which is similar to the implied mean elasticity of -6.410 in our "preferred" demand speci…cation in Table 2 . Thus, compared to our "preferred" demand speci…cation, this instrument gives similar results for plans bidding below the benchmark, but the estimate of + is of the wrong sign.
In columns (3) through (5), we use the price instruments from Cabral, Geruso, and Mahoney (2018). These instruments rely on a legislative change. As a result of the Bene…ts Improvement and Protection Act (BIPA) of 2000, rural and urban payment ‡oors were implemented in 2001.
This established minimum benchmarks in certain counties that were classi…ed as rural or urban.
Cabral, Geruso, and Mahoney (2018) construct a variable called "distance to ‡oor" given by
where j indexes counties, t indexes years, u(j) indicates whether county j is urban, b u(j)t is the ‡oor benchmark rate in 2001 ($475 for rural counties and $525 for urban counties), and c jt is the counterfactual benchmark rate had the ‡oor not been binding, which is a 3 percent update over the rate in 2000. Thus, the "distance to ‡oor" variable measures a county's "exposure" to the BIPA legislation. Cabral, Geruso, and Mahoney (2018) argue that the "distance to ‡oor" as a result of this one-time legislative change is plausibly exogenous. As in Cabral, Geruso, and Mahoney (2018), we also construct a "change in 2001" variable, which is simply the change in benchmark that occurred in a county in 2001.
Results from speci…cations using each of these two price instruments are shown in columns (3) and (4), and the two price instruments are combined in column (5). We combine all price instruments, including the county benchmark instrument, in column (6). In each case, we …nd very imprecise price coe¢ cients. In columns (3) and (4), the estimate of is of the wrong sign and is not statistically signi…cant at the 10 percent level. The estimates of + are implausibly large in magnitude, more than 10 times as large in magnitude as estimates from most of our other speci…cations. In columns (5) and (6), we obtain estimates of that are similar in magnitude to that in our "preferred"speci…cation, though less precise, but estimates of + are of the wrong sign.
In summary, we prefer to rely on the …xed e¤ects speci…cations for the main analysis. While the price coe¢ cients obtained in these speci…cations are sometimes similar in magnitude to those used in our "preferred"demand speci…cation, they are very imprecise and sometimes of the wrong sign.
This may be attributable to the fact that these price instruments are constructed from a one-time legislative change and do not exhibit any year-to-year variation, which makes them less suitable for our analysis.
B.3. Instruments for Plan' s MA Share
In Appendix Table B3 , we show demand estimates from speci…cations using several di¤erent instruments for ln(plan MA share). Each of these instruments captures the degree of competition present in each market. Column (1) shows a speci…cation identical to the "preferred" demand speci…cation in column (4) of Table 2 , except that there is no heterogeneity by consumer group.
This speci…cation includes two instruments for ln(plan MA share): the number of contracts in the county, and the number of insurers in the service area.
Recall that within each year, an MA plan serves a collection of counties that comprise the MA plan's "service area," and that a plan sets one bid for the entire service area. We therefore construct two sets of instruments (de…ned within an observation year): the number of insurers, number of contracts, or number of plans in the plan's county; and the number of insurers, number of contracts, or number of plans in the plan's service area. Columns (2) through (5) show results from each of the alternative instruments not used in the "preferred" speci…cation. Column (6) shows results from combining all six possible instruments in one speci…cation. In each of the cases shown in columns (2) through (6), we obtain estimated price coe¢ cients that are very similar to those in column (1). The estimates of range from -0.002 to -0.003, compared to -0.003 in column
(1). The estimates of + range from -0.001 to -0.004, compared to -0.004 in column (1). Implied mean elasticities range from -2.428 to -3.375, which is quite similar to the implied mean elasticity of -2.406 in column (1). Thus, the choice of instrument for ln(plan MA share) makes almost no di¤erence in the estimated price coe¢ cients.
B.4. Alternative Fixed E¤ects Models
Appendix Table B4 shows demand estimates using various combinations of year, county, contract, and plan …xed e¤ects. Each of the columns also includes …xed e¤ects for plan quality indicators.
There is one indicator for each possible "plan quality"rating, from 2.5 stars up to 5 stars. Column 1 shows a speci…cation identical to the "preferred" demand speci…cation in column (4) of Table 2 , except that there is no heterogeneity by consumer group. The "preferred" speci…cation in column
(1) has year and contract …xed e¤ects. In column (2), we do not include any …xed e¤ects other than the plan quality …xed e¤ects. In columns (3) and (4), we add in either year …xed e¤ects or contract …xed e¤ects, respectively. In column (5), we include year, county, and contract …xed e¤ects. In column (6), we include year, contract, and plan …xed e¤ects. Finally, in column (7) we include all possible …xed e¤ects: year, county, contract, and plan. In columns (2) through (7), estimates of are very similar, ranging from -0.001 to -0.002, compared to -0.003 in column (1). Thus, including various combinations of …xed e¤ects has essentially no impact on the price coe¢ cient , which is relevant for the vast majority of plans, since 96 percent of plans bid below the benchmark.
Estimates of + vary slightly more, ranging from -0.012 in columns (2) and (3) to -0.003 in columns (4) and (5). The estimate of + in column (1), which is -0.004, falls within this range. In summary, including additional …xed e¤ects leads to an implied mean elasticity that is slightly smaller in magnitude (-0.750) compared to the mean elasticity in the "preferred" speci…cation (-2.406), but these di¤erences are not su¢ ciently large to impact the conclusions from our main analysis.
B.5. Incentives for Risk Selection
Prior to the introduction of risk scoring, insurers had a clear incentive to enroll healthier bene…-ciaries and there is considerable evidence that they did. There is evidence on this dating back at least to Eggers (1980) and Eggers and Prihoda (1982) . We observed in Section 3 that MA enrollees today continue to have lower risk scores and lower mortality conditional on risk score. Of course, if bidding is su¢ ciently competitive, cost savings from favorable risk selection will translate to lower bids and be competed away. From the perspective of bidding competition, a crucial issue is whether bidding incentives on the margin are a¤ected by risk selection. In particular, a key question is whether …rms might avoid low bids to maintain more favorable enrollee characteristics.
In the context of our empirical approach, we also propose to infer each plan's costs from observed bids. If a higher bid leads to signi…cantly healthier enrollees, we would need to account for this in our estimation.
We therefore want to assess whether plans have an incentive to adjust their bids in order to change the risk composition of their enrollees. To do this, we consider speci…cations that are identical to those used for our demand estimates in Table 2 , but where the dependent variables are measures of expected insurer costs. In Appendix Table B5 , we examine the extent to which there is a relationship between price (insurer bid) and two measures of expected insurer costs for MA enrollees: the mean risk score of an MA plan's enrollees and a measure of conditional mortality.
This allows us to look separately at selection on observables and selection on unobservables.
Columns (1) through (3) of Appendix Table B5 report results where the dependent variable is the mean risk score, and include di¤erent combinations of year and contract …xed e¤ects. In column (3), which corresponds to the "preferred" demand speci…cation used in the main analysis, we estimate that when bids are below the benchmark, a $10 increase in b is associated with a 0.001 decrease in mean risk score, o¤ of a mean of 0.905, or a 0.16 percent decrease in mean risk. Even if a plan were to move its bid from the 50th percentile to the 25th percentile, which is a $33 decrease, this would be associated with only a 0.005 (0.53 percent) increase in mean risk score. When bids are above the benchmark, a $10 increase in b is associated with a 0.02 increase in mean risk score, o¤ of a mean of 0.905, or a 2.00 percent increase in mean risk. Note that this somewhat larger coe¢ cient is not empirically relevant, as the vast majority (96 percent) of plan bids are below the benchmark. Overall, we conclude that for plan bids below the benchmark, even a relatively large bid change is associated with a relatively modest change in mean risk score. It is therefore unlikely that plans have very strong incentives to adjust their bids to account for e¤ects on enrollee composition. Furthermore, because all MA payments are risk adjusted, even these small e¤ects on risk score composition do not a¤ect plan bidding incentives, to the extent that risk adjustment captures di¤erences in underlying costs.
In columns (4) through (6) of Appendix Table B5 , we explore impacts on plan bidding incentives in the case where risk adjustment does not fully capture di¤erences in expected insurer costs.
These columns are identical to columns (1) through (3), but the dependent variable is a measure of conditional mortality. The measure of conditional mortality is 100 times the mean mortality rate of an MA plan's enrollees, divided by the mean risk score of an MA plan's enrollees. This measure captures di¤erences in mortality that remain even after accounting for di¤erences in mean risk score. We interpret this as a proxy for health and expected insurer costs. In column (6), which corresponds to the "preferred" demand speci…cation used in the main analysis, we estimate that when bids are below the benchmark, a $10 increase in b is associated with a 0.036 increase in the conditional mortality measure, o¤ of a mean of 3.271, or a 1.1 percent increase. When bids are above the benchmark, a $10 increase in b is associated with a 0.074 increase in the conditional mortality measure, o¤ of a mean of 3.271, or a 2.3 percent increase in the conditional mortality measure. These e¤ects are not trivial but they are still relatively small in magnitude.
From these two sets of exercises, we conclude that there is not a robust relationship between MA plan bid and our two measures of expected insurer costs. That is, changes in plan bids do not have much e¤ect on a plan's risk composition. Thus, abstracting from this complication is unlikely to a¤ect our overall results. Taking it into account would lead to somewhat higher cost estimates following the logic of Section 3.
Appendix C: Computations and Counterfactual Exercises C.1. Variable De…nitions
A market is a county-year and markets are indexed by k. Years are indexed by t. A plan is a unique Medicare Advantage plan bene…t package and plans are indexed by j. A plan's service area is the set of counties where the plan is o¤ered, which is …xed for each calendar year but may change from year to year. The plan bid is denoted by b jt and is de…ned as the bid that an MA plan submits as its cost to cover an enrollee in its service area with risk score 1. In each year, a plan submits only one standardized plan bid for its entire service area. The plan bid in each market, denoted b jk , is de…ned based on b jt and projected enrollment weights for counties in the plan's service area. The benchmark is denoted by B k and is the administrative CMS benchmark rate for market k, which varies at the market (county-year) level. The plan benchmark is denoted by B jk and is de…ned as the plan-speci…c benchmark in market k, which is the mean of the benchmarks for all counties in the plan's service area, weighted by projected enrollment weights submitted by the plan to CMS. A plan j's excess bid is denoted by p jk = b jk B k . A plan j's excess bid above the benchmark is p
A plan j's excess bid below the benchmark is p jk = (b jk B k ) 1fb jk B k g. An individual's Medicare enrollee risk-months in year t is de…ned as the product of the individual's risk score and total months of enrollment in year t. The Medicare enrollee risk-months for plan j in market k is de…ned as the sum of Medicare enrollee risk-months for individuals enrolled in plan j in market k. The market share of plan j in market k is denoted by s jk and is de…ned as the proportion of market k's Medicare enrollee risk-months enrolled in plan j. The market share of traditional Medicare in market k, also known as the market share of plan 0 in market k, is denoted by s 0k and is de…ned as the proportion of market k's Medicare enrollee risk-months enrolled in traditional Medicare. The within-MA market share of plan j in market k is denoted by s jk and is de…ned as the proportion of market k's Medicare Advantage enrollee risk-months enrolled in plan j.
C.2. Calculating Elasticities
We calculate the own-price elasticity of demand with respect to the plan bid b j . By de…nition, the own-price elasticity of demand for plan j in market k is jk = In our preferred speci…cation, there are four consumer groups h = 1; : : : ; H, each with market size
We compute jk for each plan-market pair (j; k) and report the mean, weighted by MA enrollee risk-months, in Table 2 .
C.3. Calculating Markups and Costs
In the text we show that, for a given market, optimal bidding implies the …rst-order conditions
where c, b, and Q are J-dimensional vectors of the implied costs, observed bids, and observed shares, respectively, D b Q is the estimated matrix of own-and cross-bid derivatives, and is the ownership matrix. In this section, we discuss how we compute the markup vector (
We compute markups separately for each market. For a given market, suppose there are J plans. We de…ne a J J matrix D b Q with entries
(note that the index l that corresponds to the column is the same as the index l that corresponds to the market share). We use the estimates that we obtain from the nested logit estimation,^ and ^ , to compute the entries of D b Q for each market. We de…ne the ownership matrix with entries ( ) jl = 1fplans j and l owned by same MA parent organizationg:
Then we compute ( D b Q) 1 Q, which gives a vector of plan markups for the market. We also obtain a vector of implied plan costsĉ = b + (
C.4. Counterfactuals
In this section, we discuss the steps used to compute optimal bids and other counterfactual outcomes for the policy exercises discussed in the paper. A subset of the counterfactuals is reported in Table 3 . The remaining counterfactuals are reported in Appendix Table C1 . For each of the counterfactuals, we use the estimates of f h ; + h g H h=1 and obtained from the preferred demand speci…cation reported in Table 2 . We also use the implied plan costsĉ computed using the method described in the previous section. The steps to compute the counterfactuals are as follows:
1. Fix a particular market k. For each counterfactual, we solve for optimal bids separately for each market. Suppose there are J plans in the market, indexed by j.
2. Create a vector of counterfactual benchmark rates. Note that in our policy experiments, we sometimes change benchmark rates by a uniform dollar amount, or we sometimes replace benchmark rates so that they are proportional to TM costs.
3. Create variables for the counterfactual rebate pass-through rate, as well as estimates of plan quality^ j = ln(s j ) ln(s 0 ) ^ ln( s j ).
4. Set several parameters that a¤ect convergence: tolerance of 0.1, step size of 0.1, and maximum iterations of 500.
5. We de…ne some notation for vectors that are computed as part of the iterative procedure described below. Letb denote the vector of plan bids at a particular step in the iteration, let b denote the optimal bid obtained within an iteration by solving the insurer …rst-order condition, lets denote the vector of plan market shares at a particular step in the iteration, and let s denote the implied market share obtained within an iteration given a vector of bids and the counterfactual parameters.
6. Iterate the following steps until one of the two convergence criteria (de…ned below) is achieved (or the maximum iterations has been reached).
(a) For the …rst iteration, initialize the vectorb to the plan bids observed in the data. Also initializes to the plan market shares observed in the data.
(b) Given the bidsb and the counterfactual benchmark rates and counterfactual rebate passthrough rates, solve for new implied market shares s . Note that these implied market shares also depend on the values of^ j .
(c) Given the new implied market shares s and the counterfactual benchmark rates and counterfactual rebate pass-through rates, use the insurer …rst-order condition to solve for new optimal bids b .
(d) Using the current "guess" for the optimal plan bidsb and the new optimal bids b , interpolate between the two to de…ne a new "guess" for the optimal plan bids asb = (1 (step size)) b + (step size) b . . 7. Using this iterative procedure, we obtain a vector of optimal plan bids for each counterfactual (all of the markets converge according to at least one of the two convergence criteria we de…ne above).
8. For a given market k, compute counterfactual market-level consumer surplus using the ex- is equal to~ j minus the component that is generated by the rebate.
9. Given the optimal plan bids obtained, recompute all variables that are a function of the plan bids (rebate, premium, payments to plans, insurer pro…ts, etc.) and report per enrollee-month means in Table 3 and Appendix Table C1 .
Appendix D: Construction of Predicted TM Costs for MA Enrollees
D.1. Comparison with MedPAC and Alternative Approaches
In order to construct predicted TM costs for MA enrollees, we …rst use the Medicare claims data to construct TM costs at the county-year level. The resulting mean TM costs di¤er slightly from those published by CMS and used by MedPAC to benchmark the MA program (MedPAC, 2012).
CMS publishes county-year-level TM costs based on all aged Medicare bene…ciaries (including dual eligibles). Mechanically, CMS adds up TM costs for each county-year and divides by 12 times the number of TM enrollees in the county-year (this is done separately for Parts A and B). This is reported as a monthly TM cost. For this sample, the average risk score should be approximately 1.
It need not be exactly 1, since the risk adjustment model is calibrated separately on a subsample of TM enrollees. CMS does not report any risk-adjusted measures of TM costs.
Like CMS, we construct annual county-level TM costs based on all aged Medicare bene…ciaries (including dual eligibles). However, our approach slightly di¤ers. For each county-year, we add up TM costs and divide by the total number of TM risk-months in the county-year. Dividing by TM risk-months instead of TM enrollees is important for our exercise for two reasons. The …rst is that we obtain a risk-adjusted measure of monthly TM costs. The second is that our denominator is scaled by the number of months that a TM enrollee is actually enrolled, which is 11.3 on average (due to mortality as well as mid-year enrollment of newly eligible Medicare bene…ciaries). Thus, we construct a monthly ‡ow cost for TM coverage per insured risk unit, rather than computing the annual TM cost divided by 12. For a detailed comparison of the two approaches, see Appendix Table A7 in Curto et al. (2014) .
Our predicted TM costs are relatively simple, but it is possible to consider several possible elaborations.
1. Allow TM costs to scale non-linearly with risk score. We estimate a Poisson model of TM costs with E[x i ] = exp ( k + k ln r i ), and also with quadratic and cubic terms for ln r, allowing the k and k parameters to vary with county-year. We obtain slope parameters k slightly above 1, but the overall model does not have superior in-sample …t to the model above.
2. Allow the degree of residual selection to vary with plan type, with county-year, or with risk score. One could use proxies other than mortality to estimate the degree of residual selection.
We focus on mortality because we observe it reliably for all bene…ciaries.
3. Estimate a predictive model of TM costs using the underlying disease codes, while attempting to adjust for di¤erential coding across TM and MA. This might be something to consider in future work.
D.2. Using Conditional Mortality to Rescale MA Risk Scores
In this section, we provide details for how we use mortality conditional on risk score in order to rescale MA risk scores to make them comparable to TM risk scores. This adjustment is a way to account for the fact that MA enrollees may be less costly than TM enrollees, even conditional on risk score. These cost di¤erences conditional on risk score may arise because the risk score does not fully capture di¤erences in health or preferences for consuming health care. These cost di¤erences conditional on risk score may also arise due to the fact that MA insurers typically code health diagnoses more intensively than TM does (Geruso and Layton, 2015) . Adjusting MA risk scores is relevant for computing predicted TM costs for MA enrollees. We de…ne predicted TM costs as the TM costs that MA enrollees would have incurred had they been enrolled in TM.
As we discuss in the paper, we let T M (r) and M A (r) denote the one-year mortality rates of TM and MA enrollees, respectively. Assuming both rates are strictly increasing in r (and that expected costs scale proportionately with mortality rate), we can de…ne (r) to be an increasing function such that T M ( (r)) = M A (r). To operationalize this, we compute a single scaling factor t for each year, so that in year t we have t (r) = t r. In other words, we assume that if an MA enrollee is observed to have risk score r in the data, then we can multiply this risk score r by t in order to obtain the comparable risk score in TM.
In the following, we outline the steps to compute the t scaling factor for each year in our data.
The steps are as follows:
1. We construct a geographically balanced sample of MA and TM enrollees by randomly dropping TM enrollees in each county-year until their total number equals the total number of MA enrollees in that county-year (or vice versa if MA enrollees happen to be the majority, which is unusual). After trimming a very small number of outliers (risk scores above 10), this leaves us with a geographically balanced sample of 25,249,683 MA enrollee-years and 25,327,853 TM enrollee-years over the entire sample period from 2006 through 2011.
2. We create risk score bins of width 0.05 for risk scores between 0.3 and 3 and of width 0.25 for risk scores between 3 and 10.
3. For each bin, we compute mean TM risk score, mean TM mortality, mean MA risk score, and mean MA mortality (weighting everyone within the bin equally).
4. We sort all bins by TM mortality. We also sort all bins by MA mortality. This gives us a monotone function from risk score to mortality; one function for TM enrollees and one function for MA enrollees. Thus, each bin is associated with a "sorted" TM mortality rate and a "sorted" MA mortality rate.
5. For each bin, we …nd the maximum value of sorted TM mortality that is less than or equal to the value of sorted MA mortality associated with that bin (this is the TM mortality lower bound). We then …nd the mean TM risk score that corresponds to this TM mortality lower bound, which gives us an "implied lower risk score"for that bin (lower bound on the TM risk score associated with that bin).
6. For each bin, we …nd the minimum value of sorted TM mortality that is greater than or equal to the value of sorted MA mortality associated with that bin (this is the TM mortality upper bound). We then …nd the mean TM risk score that corresponds to this TM mortality upper bound, which gives us an "implied upper risk" for that bin.
7. For each bin, we interpolate in order to assign a TM risk score to the bin. In order to do this, we note that the value of sorted MA mortality is at a certain proportion of the distance between the TM mortality lower bound and the TM mortality upper bound associated with that bin. Then, we assign to this bin the risk score that is at the same proportion of the distance between the implied lower risk score and the implied upper risk score.
8. For each bin, we divide the assigned TM risk score by the mean MA risk score to obtain for that particular bin.
9. To obtain an overall value of t for the given observation year, we compute a weighted average of the bin-speci…c s, weighting by the number of MA enrollees in each bin. These year-speci…c h Appendix Figure E2 : Mortality rates in MA and TM, by risk score Table presents demand regression results at the market-plan level. The unit of observation is a market-plan (a market is a county-year). Standard errors are clustered at the contract level. The plan's standardized bid is denoted by b and the plan's benchmark is denoted by B. The table reports the mean of the own-price demand elasticities with respect to b (weighted by enrollee risk-months; further details are provided in Appendix C).Details on sample definitions are provided in Appendix B. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Table expands on Table 3 in the main text, using the same calculations described in the notes to that table, but reports the expanded set of counterfactuals that are plotted in Figure  5 . Details of the counterfactual calculations are described in Appendix C. See Table 3 for variable definitions and additional details. Statistics in the table are calculated using MA enrollment data from 2006-2011 and are calculated at the county-year level. We report the mean of each variable across the relevant county-years. We only include a county-year if it has at least one MA enrollee, and we weight each county-year equally when we compute the mean across county-years. We define C2 as the market share (of enrollee risk-months) of the top two insurers in a county-year, and C3 is defined analogously. The row labeled "C2 > 75%" is an indicator variable equal to one if C2 is greater than 75 percent. Other indicator variables are defined analogously. The HHI is the Herfindahl Index. 
